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Moody: A Dual Standard Solution

COMMENT

PATENTLY OBVIOUS:
A DUAL STANDARD SOLUTION
TO THE DIVERGING NEEDS OF
THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
AND PHARMACEUTICAL
PATENT INDUSTRIES
INTRODUCTION

Patents are the principal way for companies in the United States to
protect their investment in developing new inventions. Congress
designed the patent system to promote innovation by providing inventors
the opportunity to reap their labor's benefits before turning the invention
over to the public. 1 As the United States has grown, innovation has
become an increasingly important factor of our economy, and as a result,
many U.S. companies heavily rely on the patent system to protect their
research and development expenses and continue to operate
successfully? Indeed, from 1996 to 2006, the number of patents issued
I Patent laws promote this progress by offering a right of exclusion for a limited period as an
incentive to inventors to risk the often enormous costs in terms of time, research and development.
The productive effort thereby fostered will have a positive effect on society through the introduction
of new products and processes of manufacture into the economy. Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Globe
Oil & Ref. Co., 322 U.S. 471,484 (1944) (stating the reason Congress has power to legislate in the
area of intellectual property is to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.); see also EARL
W. KINTNER & JACK L. LAHR, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW PRIMER 7-11 (2d ed. 1982).
2 PATENTING
BY
ORGANIZATIONS
2006,
http://www.uspto.gov/go/oeip/taf/topo_06.htm#PartB (a table showing almost all of the top U.S.
companies and the number of patents they were granted in 2006).

71
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2008

1

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 1 [2008], Art. 3

72

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

per year to U.S. companies by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
jumped from 69,419 to 102,267, an increase of over thirty-two percent. 3
The patent system's health will therefore impact the U.S. economy's
future.
In order to be granted a patent, an invention must be new, useful,
and nonobvious. 4 These requirements measure the level of innovation
required to create the new invention and then determine if that level
warrants granting the inventor a temporary monopoly over the
invention. s In particular, the obviousness question tends to be at the
forefront because, although most nonobvious inventions are also both
new and useful, there are numerous new and useful inventions that are
not nonobvious. 6 Nonobviousness is designed to mark the specific level
of innovation needed for an invention to be patentable, and although
whether an invention is new or useful can indicate some amount of
innovation, it does not necessarily indicate that enough has been
achieved to meet that level. 7 Consequently, whether an invention is
deemed obvious can often be the key factor for determining if a patent
should be issued. 8
Recently, the patent system's health has degraded to such a point
that it has compelled the Supreme Court to address the problem three
times in a twelve-month span, culminating with a change to the
obviousness standard in the summer of 2007 with its ruling in KSR
International Co. v. Teleflex Inc. 9 In KSR, the Supreme Court narrowed
the scope of what can be patented by instructing courts to use "common
sense" when determining what is obvious, as opposed to the recent trend
of analysis where the courts failed to recognize inventors' creative
capabilities. 1O This revision in KSR, however, like past reforms to the
patent system, will only be a temporary solution because it comes with
more drawbacks than benefits. In order to address the patent system's
needs, at least two discrete standards are required for determining
obviousness.
3

PATENTS By COUNTY, STATE, AND YEAR-ALL PATENT TYPES,

http://www.uspto.gov/go/taf/csCall.htm_(Iast visited on Sept. 28, 2008).
435 U.S.c. §§ 101-103 (2004).
5 See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150-51 (1989).
6 See Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives
on Innovation, 76 CAL. L. REV. 803, 812 (1988).
7
8

1d.
See id.

9 Clarisa Long, Our Uniform Patent System, 55-FEB FED. LAW. 44 (2008); see also KSR
Int'I Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007); Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118
(2007); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
10 See KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1742 (2007).

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol39/iss1/3

2

Moody: A Dual Standard Solution

2008]

A DUAL STANDARD SOLUTION

73

Information Technology (hereinafter "IT") and pharmaceutical
patents allow for the most illustrative analysis of the patent system's
diverse needs and corresponding problems. This is because the IT and
pharmaceutical industries contain the most divergent needs with respect
to patents, and therefore best represent the two ends of the patent system
spectrum in regard to obviousness. II The IT industry is overflowing with
patents and as a result a more restrictive obviousness standard is needed
to slow the introduction of new patents into the overcrowded industry.
Contrarily, due to the huge scope of Markush claims,12 which are
commonly used in pharmaceutical patents, the pharmaceutical industry is
operating with a relatively low number of patents. Accordingly, unlike
the IT industry, the pharmaceutical industry needs a less restrictive
obviousness standard so it can be confident that each of the few patents it
acquires is valid. 13 Therefore, to be effective, any solution to the
obviousness standard issue will have to address both of these fields'
needs, and if flexible enough to accomplish that, the solution will likely
also be adequate to address the needs of the fields closer to the middle of
the patent spectrum.
Additionally, for the purposes of this discussion, IT patents include
computer and Internet software, and Internet related business method

II While every industry has different needs regarding the obviousness standard, the IT and
pharmaceutical industries represent the opposite ends of the spectrum in this regard and also
represent two of the largest and most important industries in the U.S. economy. Indeed, according to
a recent government report the top ten companies in the pharmaceutical industry earned almost $40
billion in net profits in 2006. http://oversight.house.gov/documents/200609l9ll5623-70677.pdf
(last visited on Sept. 28, 2008). Also, in the IT industry, according to www.CNNMoney.com. the
top 5 internet services companies alone earned over $5.6 billion in net profits in 2005.
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500/industries/lnterneCServices_and_Retailingll.ht
ml. (last visted on 9/28/08). Additionally, IT patents "are ... responsible for a major share of patent
lawsuits [and] thus playa central role in the failure of the patent system as a whole. Any serious
effort at patent reform must address these problems and failure to deal with the problems of software
patents--either with software specific measures or general reforms-will likely doom any reform
effort." JAMES BESSEN AND MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE How JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS,
AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 16 (Princeton University Press 2008), available at
http://researchoninnovation.orgldopatentsworkldopat9.pdf.
12 "A Markush claim is a claim on a patent application that includes elements listing
alternative chemicals, materials, or steps in a process. A Markush claim typically has language such
as 'selected from the group consistmg of.' The alternatives must all give the same result, rather than
patentably distinct products. The name derives from Ex parte Markush, 1925 Dec. Comm'r Pat.
126." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004); see also Manual of Patent Examining Procedure §
803.02 (2007).
13 See FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY, ch. 3 at 5-6 (2003), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003110/innovationrpt.pdf ("The low number of patents contained in a
pharmaceutical product means that, as panelists noted, the development of patent thickets is
generally not a concern.").
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patents. 14 Pharmaceutical patents include only drug patents that are
subject to Food and Drug Administration (hereinafter "FDA") approval.
IT does not include hardware, electronics, and other material-based
technology, as those industries' needs are closer to those of the
pharmaceutical industry.
This Comment proposes the use of a specifically tailored
obviousness standard as a new solution to the IT and pharmaceutical
patent industries' divergent needs. Part I summarizes the obviousness
standard's history in patent law. Part II illustrates how the IT and
pharmaceutical industries have divergent needs. Part III describes why
using a single standard for the obviousness inquiry is inadequate to meet
the needs of both the IT and pharmaceutical industries. Part IV
illustrates why the obviousness standard needs to be specifically tailored
for the IT and pharmaceutical industries. Finally, Part V concludes that a
dual standard for obviousness is needed to effectively address the IT and
pharmaceutical industries' needs.
1.

THE "OBVIOUSNESS" STANDARD'S HISTORY AND
IMPORTANCE

Because of its flexibility, the standard for what is obvious has
become the key element in determining what level of innovation merits
the grant of a patent. In an effort to perfect the definition of obviousness,
the judiciary has struggled with the standard on numerous occasions,
changing it from very strict,15 to fairly lenient,16 and then most recently
back to strict. 17 Despite this effort, none of these strictness levels for the
standard has proven to be suitable in the long term. Congress, although
trying to help with the problem indirectly by addressing tangential issues,

14 Although there is no uniformly agreed upon definition, generally, business method patents
are patents that protect processes that are generally implemented by computers, and that are involved
in operating a business or that define a product or service provided by a business. Common
examples are Amazon.com's "one-click" patent that automatically fills out billing/purchase
information required for online shopping (U.S. Patent No. 5,960,411), or Priceline.com's "reverse
auction" method for purchasing plane tickets online (U.S. Patent No. 5,794,207). See Lois Matelan,
The Continuing Controversy Over Business Method Patents, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. U. 189, 191-92 (2007).
15 Paul Otterstedt, Unwrapping File Wrapper Estoppel in the Federal Circuit: A New
Economic Policy Approach, 67 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 405, 420-21 (1993) ("In the 1950s, growing antipatent bias was reflected by judicial hostility towards patents, including expansion of prosecution
history estoppel, among other things.").
16 Michael Davis, Patent Politics, 56 S.C. L. REv. 337, 371 (2004) (stating that since the
creation of the Federal Circuit during the pro-business 1980s, however, the country has entered a
"pro-patent" cycle that its boosters have coined "The Era of the Patent").
17 KSR Int'I Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007).
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has chosen to leave the ultimate responsibility of refining the
obviousness standard with the judiciary. Therefore, until the jUdiciary
discovers an obviousness standard that can stand the test of time, the
patent system will be stuck in what has been a cycle of inadequate
refinement.
A.

THE OBVIOUSNESS STANDARD IS VITAL TO THE PATENT
SYSTEM

Generally, to be patentable an invention must be (1) useful, (2)
novel, and (3) nonobvious. 18 Of these elements, the first two-usefulness and novelty-are met by anything (1) having a current use (2)
that was not previously in existence. However, what is required for an
invention to be nonobvious has resisted precise definition, and as a
result, the legislature used broad statutory language when defining
obviousness. 19 These definitions' overall effect has been to bring the
obviousness standard to the forefront of what warrants a patent because,
unlike the first two elements, the flexibility in the obviousness standard
has bestowed on the judiciary wide discretion to interpret the standard
and thereby control what level of innovation deserves a patent. 20
An invention is "useful" if (1) it'is capable of use, (2) it achieves
some human purpose, and (3) that purpose is not contrary to public
policy.21 Generally, this requirement is usually met because most things,
especially those for which a patent is sought, can be described as having
a use, and those uses can generally be framed in a way that is not
contrary to public policy. An invention is novel if the invention has not
already been patented and is not already within the knowledge of the
relevant public (Le., within the public domain).22 This simply means that

35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (2004).
See S. REp. No. 82-1979, at 2399 (1952) (indicating that the language used in § 103 to
codify the obviousness requirement had to be sufficiently broad so as to incorporate a legal concept
that had been expressed in a large variety of ways.); see also 35 U.S.C. § \03 (2004).
20 Jessica Silbey, The Mythical Beginnings of Intellectual Property, 15 OEO. MASON L. REv.
319,332 (of the three requirements, nonobviousness has been caIled "the ultimate condition for
patentability"); John R. Thomas. Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 771, 789
(2003».
21 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 4.01 (2005); see Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Link
Aviation, Inc., 182 F. Supp. 106 (N.D.N.Y. 1959) ("The usefulness required by this section as [an]
element of patentability is relative, and implies practicability as distinguished from perfection.")
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 298 F.
Supp. 435 (W. D. Mich. 1969) ("Utility, within meaning of this section means that object of patent is
capable of performing some beneficial function claimed for it.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
22 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc. 489 U.S. 141, 148 (1989) ("The novelty
requirement of patentability is presently expressed in 35 U.S.c. §§ \o2(a) and (b), which provide: 'A
18

19
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the invention cannot have been already invented or publicly known.
Therefore, because most patents can meet the "usefulness" requirement,
and the novelty requirement only precludes issuance if the invention was
already known, neither requirement is sufficiently rigorous to be used as
a measure of an invention's value to society. As a result, obviousness
becomes "the ultimate condition of patentability,,,23 and serves as the
judiciary's most effective means of ensuring that an invention's value to
society justifies the grant of a patent. 24
The judiciary determines if an invention is "obvious" by asking if,
given the prior art,25 a person having ordinary skill in the relevant art
(hereinafter "PHOSITA") would find it obvious. 26 More specifically, a
PHOSITA is a hypothetical individual created by patent law as a way of
defining the ordinary skill level present in any member of the field of
innovation. 27 This means that first the court must decide the scope of the

person shall be entitled to a patent unless- (a) the invention was known or used by others in this
country, or patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the
invention thereof by the applicant for patent, or (b) the invention was patented or described in a
printed publication in this or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country more than
one year prior to the date of application for patent in the United States .... ' Sections 102(a) and (b)
operate in tandem to exclude from consideration for patent protection knowledge that is already
available to the public.").
23 Lee Petherbridge, The Federal Circuit and Patentability: An Empirical Assessment 0/ the
Law o/Obviousness, 85 TEX. L. REv. 2051,2054 (2007).
24 Although a patent's value to society is impossible to definitively quantify, because the
stated purpose of patents is to promote innovation, whether an invention's value merits a patent
should be characterized with that goal in mind. Therefore, the social value of an invention could be
measured by asking: if a patent was granted for the invention, would the amount of investment in
innovation it encourages (by providing security as to the return on that investment) outweigh the
amount of innovation it discourages (by forcing other inventors to invent around it or pay for a
license to use it in their own inventions). This is an oversimplification, but it represents the balance
that the judiciary must keep by determining what deserves a patent.
25 Prior art in the context of patents is knowledge that is publicly known, used by others, or
available on the date of invention to a person of ordinary skill in an art, including what would be
obvious from that knowledge. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2002). Prior art includes (I) information in
applications for previously patented inventions; (2) information that was published more than one
year before a patent application is filed; and (3) information in other patent applications and
inventor's certificates filed more than a year before the application is filed. [d.
26 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. I, 17-18 (1966).
27 This legal tool is utilized so that the skill of an inventor is measured not against that of a
layperson, but against the skill of other ordinary inventors in the same field. [d. Additionally,
although it might seem that because a PHOSITA in the pharmaceutical industry would likely be an
individual with a doctorate in chemistry, whereas a PHOSITA in the IT industry would often have
only a bachelors degree in computer science, it would create an intrinsically higher obviousness
standard for pharmaceuticals. This difference in education level should, in theory, be
counterbalanced by an intrinsically more difficult field. In other words, if more education is needed
to work in the pharmaceutical field, then it is likely because it is more difficult to innovate in that
field. Therefore, what is obvious to a PHOSITA remains relatively the same for both the IT and
pharmaceutical industries.
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prior art in the relevant field, and then the skill level possessed by an
"ordinary person" in that field. 28 Using this infonnation, the court can
then decide whether that "ordinary person" with access to that scope of
prior art would have found the invention obvious?9 Each of these
determinations - the scope of the prior art, the ordinary skill level, and
what the PHOSIT A would find obvious - are sufficiently broad that they
provide the court with substantial leeway to adjust what is required to
meet those elements. 3o This flexibility is critical to satisfy the patent
system's changing needs and distinguishes obviousness from usefulness
and novelty as the court's best tool to accurately control the value society
places on inventions.
B.

THE HISTORY OF THE OBVIOUSNESS STANDARD

The test for determining whether an invention is obvious has been
subject to continual refinement. 3 ! The Supreme Court first fonnulated
the test in 1851 as a patentability condition,32 but Congress did not codify
the test until the Patent Act of 1952/3 in an attempt to consolidate the
varying obviousness definitions found throughout the courts at the
time. 34 In 1966, the Supreme Court created a four-factor test (hereinafter
"the Graham factors") to determine an invention's level of obviousness,
which added limited stability to this new requirement's interpretation?5
In the same opinion the Court also listed what are known as "secondary
factors" that help illuminate if an invention passes the four-factor test
and is therefore nonobvious. 36 The flexibility of the Graham factors
28

Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1,17-18 (1966).

29

[d.

30 "What is obvious is not a question upon which there is likely to be uniformity of thought
in every given factual context." Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. I, 18 (1966) (discussing the
broadness of what are now known as the "Graham factors" and the resulting expansive leeway
allowed for in their interpretation).
31 See FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY, ch. I at 15-28 (2003), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/1 O/innovationrpt. pdf.
32 Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248, 267 (1850).
33 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2004).
34 S. REp. No. 82-1979 (1952) (stating that obviousness has been expressed in a large variety
of ways in decisions of the courts and in writings. Section 103 states this requirement in the title).
35 "[T)he [I) scope and [2) content of the prior art are ... determined; [3) differences
between the prior art and the claims at issue are ... ascertained; and [4) the level of ordinary skill in
the pertinent art resolved. Against this background the obviousness or nonobviousness of the subject
matter is determined." Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. I, 17-18 (1966).
36 "Such secondary considerations as commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs,
failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give light to the circumstances surrounding the origin of
the subject matter sought to be patented." [d.
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allowed the courts to avoid being tied down to a certain high or low
standard, but in practice, without further guidance, the Graham factors
proved to be too vague for the courts to apply with consistency.37
Despite this effort, a uniform understanding as to what is an
"obvious" invention remained elusive, and a patent case's outcome
depended more on where the trial occurred and the particular circuit's
general attitude toward patents than the particular case's actual facts. 38
As a result, in an unprecedented move, Congress in 1982 created the
Federal Circuit, an independent patent circuit with a distinct goal of
solving the obviousness conundrum. 39
The Federal Circuit's solution to this obviousness problem was to
elaborate further on the Graham four-factor test, describing a more
specific obviousness definition that was substantially easier to apply with
consistency.4o
This elaboration'S result however, was a loss of
flexibility: it forced the Federal Circuit to decide whether the standard
would be either minimally restrictive or greatly restrictive on one's
ability to obtain a patent. Ultimately, the Federal Circuit chose a
minimally restric~ive standard as a way of countering the greatly
restrictive standard and anti-patent trend that had revealed itself
previously in the federal courtS. 41 To accomplish this, first the Federal

37 See KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1734 (2007); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., EObviousness, 7 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 363, 364 (2001) (explaining that historical
standards for obviousness have often been too vague to be applied consistently).
38 Lee Petherbridge & R. Polk Wagner, The Federal Circuit and Patentability: An Empirical
Assessment of the Law of Obviousness, 85 TEX. L. REV. 205 I, 2057 (2007) ("[P]atent law [is] an
area in which the application of the law to the facts of a case often produces different outcomes in
different courtrooms in substantially similar cases."); see also S. REp. No. 97-275, at 3-6 (1981), as
reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. II, 13-16 (discussing reports that forum shopping was common to
patent litigation).
39 Hon. Pauline Newman, On Global Patent Cooperation, 8 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA
& ENT. L. J. 3, 8 (1997).
40 See KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1730 (2007) ("[S]eeking to resolve the
obviousness question with more uniformity and consistency, the Federal Circuit has employed a
'teaching, suggestion, or motivation' (TSM) test, under which a patent claim is only proved obvious
if the prior art, the problem's nature, or the knowledge of a person having ordinary skill in the art
reveals some motivation or suggestion to combine the prior art teachings.").
41 The Federal Circuit also contributed to this pro-patent bias by increasing the quantity of
injunctions for infringement, as well as the money totals awarded for infringement. Matthew Sag &
Kurt Rohde, Patent Reform and Differential Impact, 8 MINN. 1. L. SCI. & TECH. 1,41 (2007) ("Since
its formation, the Federal Circuit has tended to exacerbate these penalties through its increased
willingness to order preliminary and final injunctions, award enhanced damages for willful
infringement, and its greater flexibility in calculating patent damages in general."); Michael Davis,
Patent Politics, 56 S.C. L. REv. 337, 371 (2004) (stating that since the creation of the Federal Circuit
during the pro-business 1980s, however, the country has entered a "pro-patent" cycle that its
boosters have coined "The Era of the Patent.").
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Circuit eliminated the "synergy" requirement for combination patents. 42
The synergy test stated that if an invention combined two or more pieces
of prior art, the result of the combination had to be unexpected to be
considered nonobvious. 43
This synergy requirement removal thus
allowed for more combination patents44 to be granted, which, because
they were only a combination of previously known technology, tended to
stretch the limits of what could be considered nonobvious. 45 Then, in an
attempt to create more uniformity and consistency, the Federal Circuit
popularized the teaching, suggestion and motivation test (hereinafter
"TSM test") to help determine what is obvious. 46 Specifically, the TSM
test stated that for pieces of prior art to render an invention obvious, the
prior art must contain some teaching, suggestion, or motivation that
would have led a PHOSIT A to modify the prior art to arrive at the
claimed invention. 47 This added rigidity to the obviousness analysis and
further narrowed the realm of what was obvious by stating that unless the
prior art contained an express or written teaching, motivation, or
suggestion to be combined, then the invention was nonobvious. 48
As a result, in its short history the obviousness standard has swung
like a pendulum between extremes of leniency and strictness. 49 These
Chore-Time Equip. Inc. v. Cumberland Corp., 713 F.2d 774, 781 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 152-53 (1950)
(introducing the synergy test).
44 A combination patent is a patent granted for an invention that unites existing components
in a novel way. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
45 Chore-Time Equip. Inc. v. Cumberland Corp., 713 F2d 774, 781 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
46 KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1734 (2007) ("Seeking to resolve the
question of obviousness with more uniformity and consistency, the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit has employed an approach referred to by the parties as the 'teaching, suggestion, or
motivation' test (TSM test) .... n).
47 In other words, an invention is obvious under the TSM test if the pieces of prior art, in
addition to cumulatively describing every aspect of the invention, also contain some explicit
teaching, suggestion or motivation to combine them. A suggestion or motivation to combine
generally arises in the references themselves, but may also be inferred from the nature of the
problem or occasionally from the knowledge of those of ordinary skill in the art. See In re Roufett,
149 F .3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
48 ACS Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Montefiore Hosp., 732 F.2d 1572, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
49 See Paul Otterstedt, Unwrapping File Wrapper Estoppel in the Federal Circuit: A New
Economic Policy Approach, 67 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 405, 420-21 (1993) ("In the 1950s, growing antipatent bias was reflected by judicial hostility towards patents, including expansion of prosecution
history estoppel, among other things"); Michael Davis, Patent Politics, 56 S.C. L. REV. 337, 371
(2004) (noting that since the creation of the Federal Circuit during the pro-business 1980s the
country entered a "pro-patent" cycle that its boosters have coined "The Era of the Patent."); KSR
Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) (the most recent "swing inducing" Supreme Court
case); see generally Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years o/Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law,
1900-2000,88 CAL. L. REv. 2187, 2215-2232 (2000); see also FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE
INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY, ch. I, at 1528 (2003), http://www .ftc.gov/os/2003/1 O/innovationrpt. pdf.
42

43
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changes have been caused by (1) the importance of refining the
obviousness standard due to its direct relationship with the health of the
patent system,50 and (2) the elusive task of finding a standard sufficiently
flexible so that it effectively meets all of the patent system's needs while
simultaneously being sufficiently concrete to permit consistent
application. 51 Prior to the Federal Circuit's inception in 1982, there was
a swing in the courts toward a more restrictive obviousness standard
requiring there be a "flash of creative genius" to merit a patent,52 which,
by expanding what was considered obvious, lowered the number of
patents being granted. 53 Then in 1982 the "pro-patent" Federal Circuit
was created and the standard for obviousness swung back, becoming
more and more lenient and increasing the number of patents issued. 54
Recently, the Supreme Court announced another swing toward a high
standard with its holding in KSR v. Telejlex, by explaining that common
sense should be used in determining if an invention is obvious given the
prior art. 55 Essentially, by allowing patent examiners to justify an
obviousness rejection of a patent application by citing a broad concept
such as common sense, the Court raised the bar for what is nonobvious

50 "Important recent studies of the patent system have also fingered obviousness as a
particular area of policy makers' concern." Lee Petherbridge & R. Polk Wagner, The Federal
Circuit and Patentability: An Empirical Assessment of the Law of Obviousness, 85 TEX. L. REv.
2051,2054 (2007) (citing FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE
OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY, at 8-15 (2003), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10Iinnovationrpt.pdf ("reporting the testimony and writings of a number
of commentators critical of the Federal Circuit's obviousness law"); NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL
OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, 18-19 (Stephen A.
Merrill, Richard C. Levin & Mark B. Myers eds., 2004) (identifying the court's obviousness law as
in need of change».
51 Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., E-Obviousness, 7 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 363, 364
(2001) (historical standards for obviousness have often been too vague to be applied consistently);
Katherine J. Strandburg, Law and the Science of Networks: An Overview and an Application to the
"Patent Explosion," 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1293, 1329 (2006) (describing the obviousness
standard as too narrow to meet the needs of all the patent industries).
52 Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law, 19002000, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2187, 2223 (2000) (citing Cuno Eng'g Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp.,
314 U.S. 84, 91 (1941».
53 See Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law, /9002000,88 CAL. L. REV. 2187,2223 (2000).
54 Katherine J. Strandburg, Law and the Science of Networks: An Overview and an
Application to the "Patent Explosion," 21 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 1293, 1329 (Fall 2006) (discussing
how the Federal Circuit's first patent opinion, inaugurated what many have argued has been an era
of patent-friendly legal review after a period of purported judicial hostility to patentees).
55 KSR Int'I Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1742 (2007) ("Common sense teaches,
however, that familiar items may have obvious uses beyond their primary purposes, and in many
cases a person of ordinary skill will be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents together like
pieces of a puzzle.").
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and therefore patentable. 56
The changes made by the Federal Circuit, coupled with the birth of
the Internet and subsequent IT boom, have generally led to an unhealthy
influx of IT patents and the need for expensive cross-licensing. 57
Basically, the low nonobviousness standard allowed IT patents to be
granted in increasing numbers and made it increasingly difficult to create
an invention that did not incorporate numerous existing patents. 58 As a
result, inventors have been compelled to negotiate licenses with all the
owners of the previously existing patents, creating a complicated crosslicensing web. 59 In total, the volume of patents was stifling innovation in
the IT sector. 60 The transaction costs 61 associated with the crosslicensing, added to the actual licenses' royalty costs, were increasing the
cost of business operations. The end result was the gradual elimination
of the viability ofsmall market inventors,62 viability.63

56

See id.

"To mitigate [a patented product] hold up in the context of a patent thicket, some firms in
certain industries have accumulated large patent portfolios ... This leads the firms to reach licensing
agreements with each other, often portfolio cross-licensing agreements." FED. TRADE COMM'N, To
PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLlCY,
ch. 2, at 30 (2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf.
58 See David B. Conrad, Mining the Patent Thicket: The Supreme Court's Rejection of the
Automatic Injunction Rule in eBay v. MercExchange, 26 REV. LITIG. \\9, 139 (2007) (discussing the
increase in patent lawsuits due to the unhealthy influx oflT patents).
59 Alternatively, if the inventor believes that some of the existing patents are invalid, he or
she has the option of filing for a third-party reexamination of the existing patent, but this requires
both additional time and money and risks the patent being found valid and requiring the inventor to
negotiate a license anyway. Also, an inventor sometimes will just document invalidity arguments to
the existing patent and move forward with the invention, but this risks the costs of a future
infringement lawsuit from the existing patent owner and again the possibility that the existing patent
will be found valid.
60 See FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLlCY, ch. I, at 31 (2003), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf; see also Clarisa Long, Our Uniform Patent
System, 55 FEB. FED. LAW 44,44-45 (2008).
61 A transaction cost is a "[c]ost connected with a process transaction, such as a broker's
commission, the time and effort expended to arrange a deal, or the cost involved in litigating a
dispute." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, cost (8th ed. 2004).
62 In this context, "small market inventors" are inventors who either personally manufacture
and market their patented products, or who are invested in making good faith efforts to license the
right to manufacture and market their patented product in order to recoup their research and
development costs and make a profit. This definition is distinguished from "patent trolls," who are
not primarily interested in marketing or manufacturing their patents, but instead are interested in
finding a manufacturer and marketer who are infringing on their patents and then threaten litigation
to obtain exorbitant licensing fees. This distinction is critical because a small market inventor's
research and development costs compel it to incur transaction costs in order to profit on the
invention, whereas a patent troll has little if any research and development costs and can therefore
avoid most transaction costs.
63 See FED. TRADE COMM'N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
57
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CONGRESS'S ATTEMPTS TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM
HAVE BEEN INEFFECTUAL

Patent law refonn has been an issue before Congress for the past
few years but has yet to produce any results. 64 This failure is the result
of the anticipated disparate effects that proposed refonns would have on
the conflicting interests of the big companies in the IT and
phannaceutical industries. 65 The phannaceutical industry is adamant that
refonn of the current patent law, which has allowed them to flourish, is
largely unnecessary. The IT industry is equally adamant that the current
patent law, which has begun to stifle the IT industry, is flawed and needs
substantial refonn. 66 Thus, each time a new patent refonn bill is created,
the opposing lobbyists from the IT and phannaceutical industries
produce a stalemate in Congress by dividing the vote. 67 The most recent
proposed legislation illustrates these difficulties. Two of the main
proposed refonns in the Patent Refonn Act of 2007 are an adjustment to
the infringement damages award process and a new post-grant opposition
procedure. 68
The adjustments to the infringement damages award process,
principally, would lower the amount of damages granted for an
infringement lawsuit by narrowing the scope of what can be considered
in calculating a reasonable royalty. They would also preclude the award
of punitive damages for willful infringement as long as the infringer had
a good-faith belief that it was not infringing on a valid patent. 69 Because
both of these effects would be favorable to defendants in infringement
lawsuits, they would primarily benefit the big companies in the IT
industry, which are constantly defending infringement lawsuits due to
"patent trolls" and the overlapping patents created by the IT patent glut. 7o
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY, executive summary, at 6-7 (2003), available at
http://www .ftc .gov1os/20031 1Olinnovati onrpt. pdf.
64 At the time of this paper, Sept. I, 2008, the newest version of the Patent Reform Act had
been passed by the House of Representatives, but had yet to be passed by the Senate. Patent Reform
Act, H.R. 1908, II Oth Congo (2007).
65 "Generally speaking, software and other Big Tech industries want broader revisions of the
patent statute, whereas the 'Big Pharma' sector does not. According to Alan Fisch, a patent litigator
with Kaye Scholer in Washington, D.C., patent reform 'has pitted two of the leading technology
sectors against one another, specifically the computer industry versus pharmaceutical industry.'"
Clarisa Long, Our Uniform Patent System, 55 FEB. FED. LAW 44 (2008).
66

[d.

See id.
Patent Reform Act, H.R. 1908, II Oth Congo §§ 5-6 (2007).
69 Clarisa Long, Our Uniform Patent System, 55 FEB. FED. LAW 44,46 (2008).
70 "Microsoft's Brad Smith has said that his company spends 'close to $100 million annually
to defend against an average of 35-40 patent lawsuits simultaneously.' Often the patent being
67
68
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On the other hand, big pharmaceutical companies are primarily plaintiffs
in infringement lawsuits, due to the importance of preventing
infringement of each of their relatively low number of patents, and
therefore would be harmed by the proposed amendments. 7l
Similarly, the proposed post-grant opposition provision has the
effect of pitting big IT against big pharmaceuticals. 72 The effect of the
post-grant opposition provision would be to allow the validity of patents
to be challenged without filing a lawsuit; more significantly, these outof-court challenges would lack the presumption of validity that issued
patents enjoy in court. 73 Again, because the big IT companies are often
the defendants in infringement actions, they support the provision as a
cheaper way to dispel frivolous but expensive litigation. 74 Predictably,
because the big pharmaceutical companies need to protect the validity of
their relatively few patents, they oppose this provision because it would
provide another opportunity for them to lose their patents. 75 The ultimate
result of these disparities on the big IT and pharmaceutical companies is
that both the support and opposition to the reform are well-funded and
lead to a stalemate in the legislative process. 76 Furthermore, given this
difficulty, it is not surprising that Congress has not attempted to amend
the actual language of the requirement that an invention be nonobvious,
as such a major change would likely only provoke an even greater
conflict between the IT and pharmaceutical industries. 77 Accordingly,
even if the current bill were passed, it still would not solve the problems
with the obviousness standard itself and, as a result, it will be left to the
judiciary to fix the current problems in the patent law system until there
is significantly increased agreement in the legislature. 78

enforced covers only a small part of the allegedly infringing product." Ed. at 45.
71 Ed.
73

See id. at 47.
[d. at 46.

74

Ed.

72

"Opponents of the proposed reforms say that reforms go too far, weakening the value of
patents and making them easier to challenge. 'It's almost everything an infringer could ever want,'
says Phil Johnson, the chief patent attorney for Johnson & Johnson." Ed. at 47.
76 See id. at 46-47.
77 Unless, of course, the amendment created a dual standard as outlined in this Comment that
satisfied the needs of both the IT and pharmaceutical industries.
78 There is also a possibility that the federal executive branch might attempt to address the
problem by defining a new administrative process for interpreting the obviousness standard in the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office regulations; thus far, however, the executive branch has failed to
show any inclination to effectuate such a rule change.
75
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THE SUPREME COURT'S EFFORTS TO RAISE THE
ST ANDARD FOR OBVIOUSNESS BOTH INDIRECTLY AND
DIRECTLY WILL ONLY RESULT IN A TEMPORARY
SOLUTION

The Supreme Court recently attempted to address this unhealthy
state of patent law in the IT sector with its rulings in three cases in 2006
and 2007. 79 Unfortunately, although they will have some short-term
benefits, these rulings either only indirectly address the issue by treating
the current symptoms ("patent trolls") and not the source (the
obviousness standard itself), or directly address the issue but create only
a temporary solution because they neglect the needs of the
pharmaceutical industry. Consequently, with time, these changes will
only result in an unhealthy pharmaceutical industry crying out for
changes, as the IT industry is now,so and the cost of altering the
obviousness standard will be incurred yet again.
The first two of these Supreme Court decisions, eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange L.L. C. and MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., do not
directly address the obviousness issue, but instead focus on its effects,
i.e., the viability of "patent trollS."SI Specifically, the eBay case
restricted the availability of permanent Injunctions for patent
infringement and the MedImmune case broadened the scope of who has
standing to challenge a patent's validity.s2 In eBay, the Supreme Court
found that permanent injunctions to prevent patent infringement should
not be granted either "categorically" or as a "general rule" when there is
a finding of infringement;S3 rather, an evaluation needs to be made on a
79 KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007); Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech,
Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
80 As illustrated by the amicus briefs filed in support of the petitioner in KSR. Brief for Amici
Curiae Time Warner Inc., lAC/Interactive Corp., and Viacom, Inc. in Support of Petitioner, KSR
Int'1 Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) (No. 04-1350), 2006 WL 2452363; Brief for
Amicus Curiae Computer & Communications Industry Association in Support of Petitioner, KSR
Int'I Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) (No. 04- I 350), 2006 WL 2452364; Brief of Amici
Curiae Cisco Systems Inc., General Motors Corporation, Hallmark Cards, Incorporated, Fortune
Brands Inc. and Electrolux North America in Support of Reversal, KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,
127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) (No. 04-1350), 2006 WL 2452365; 2006 WL 2453601, KSR Int'I Co. v.
Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) (No. 04-1350), 2006 WL 2453603; Brief of Intel Corporation
and Micron Technology, Inc. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, KSR Int'I Co. v. Teleflex
Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) (No. 04-1350), 2006 WL 2453606; Brief of Amicus Curiae
International Business Machines Corporation in Support of Neither Party, KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex
Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) (No. 04-1350), 2006 WL 2430566.
81 Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.. , 127 S. Ct. 764, 777 (2007); eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 393-94 (2006).
821d.

83

eBay Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.c., 547 U.S. 388, 393-94 (2006).
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case-by-case basis using the traditional four-factor test. 84 With this
holding, the Supreme Court undercut the ability of "patent trolls" to use
the threat of injunctions as leverage to obtain excessive licensing fees for
their patents. 85
In Medlmmune, the Court continued to chip away at the power of
"patent trolls" by finding that even the licensee of a patent is not
prevented from challenging the patent's validity.86 Prior to this case,
licensees of a patent were prevented from challenging the patent because
it was thought that by already paying for the license they were implicitly
conceding the patent's validity.8? In particular, this ruling addressed the
dilemma that a licensee faces when confronted with the threat of
infringement. 88
Now, instead of having to challenge the patent
immediately and put its own products on hold, the licensee will be able
to continue fabrication of its allegedly infringing products by acquiring a
license for the patent while still researching the validity of the licensor's
patent. Although this ruling and that in the eBay case provide indirect
help by addressing the current symptoms of the problem, they do not
provide a long-term solution for the obviousness question itself, and
therefore are only short-term "band-aids." In possible recognition of
this, the Supreme Court subsequently accepted the KSR case and
attempted to address the obviousness issue head-on.
In KSR, the Supreme Court made a dramatic change to the
obviousness standard and shifted the tide of the patent system by
increasing the difficulty of obtaining a patent. 89 Although the Supreme
Court did not change the wording of the TSM test, it redefined its
meaning so as to remove the rigidity of its recent application90 and allow

84 "According to well-established principles of equity, a plaintiff seeking a pennanent
injunction must satisfy a four-factor test before a court may grant such relief. A plaintiff must
demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as
monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of
hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the
public interest would not be disserved by a pennanent injunction." e8ay Inc. v. MercExchange
L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 390-92 (2006).
85 e8ay Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 395-97 (2006) (Kennedy, 1.,
concurring).
86 Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764, 777 (2007).
87 Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764, 777 (2007) (Thomas, 1., dissenting).
88 See Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764, 777 (2007).
89 See KSR In!'1 Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007).
90 KSR In!'1 Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1741 (2007) ("The obviousness analysis
cannot be confined by a fonnalistic conception of the words teaching, suggestion, and motivation, or
by overemphasis on the importance of published articles and the explicit content of issued
patents. . .. [Wjhen a court transfonns the general principle into a rigid rule that limits the
obviousness inquiry, as the Court of Appeals did here, it errs.").
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for a larger consideration of "common sense" in determining if an
invention is obvious. 91 Principally, the Court changed the TSM test,
described above, such that instead of only requiring the reference of the
motivations of the inventor in the case at hand, the test now requires
reference to the motivations of all "ordinary" inventors in the relevant
industry; in other words, all the motivations of a PHOSIT A.92
These rulings are so recent that the repercussions of these changes
have yet to be seen, but it is likely that they will significantly reduce the
number of patents granted. In particular, combination patents,93 which
were already on the boundary of what was obvious because they involve
the combination of known technologies, will become increasingly
difficult to obtain. As a result, the strain on the IT industry from the glut
of patents will likely lessen, but the pharmaceutical industry may suffer
due to its need for patents that appear to be simple combinations of
previously known compounds. 94
II.

THE NEEDS OF THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRIES ARE DIVERGENT

Each of the main patent industries has different needs in relation to
the strictness of the obviousness standard in order to best promote
innovation, but none are as conflicting as those of the IT and

91 KSR Int'I Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1742 (2007) ("Common sense teaches,
however, that familiar items may have obvious uses beyond their primary purposes, and in many
cases a person of ordinary skill will be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents together like
pieces of a puzzle.").
92 KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1742 (2007) ("The first error ... was
to ... [hold] that courts and patent examiners should look only to the problem the patentee was
trying to solve. The Court of Appeals failed to recognize that the problem motivating the patentee
may be only one of many addressed by the patent's subject matter. The question is not whether the
combination was obvious to the patentee but whether the combination was obvious to a [PHOSIT A].
Under the correct analysis, any need or problem known in the field 0/ endeavor at the time of
invention and addressed by the patent can provide a reason for combining the elements in the
manner claimed.") (emphasis added, internal citations omitted).
93 A combination patent is a patent granted for an invention that unites ex isting components
in a novel way. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, patent (8th ed. 2004).
94 Markush claims, which are a common type of claim in pharmaceutical patents, at first
glance seem to be complex - and therefore less obvious - due to the large quantity of equivalent
molecular subparts described in the dependent claims. However, for the purposes of being
"nonobvious" under 35 U.S.C. § 103, only the underlying independent claims need to be analyzed
because any independent claim that is found to be nonobvious will also have the effect of making the
claims dependent on it nonobvious. Therefore, a Markush claim's apparent complexity is not an
accurate indication of its complexity under the obviousness analysis. See Robert Spar, 37 CFR Part
I Examination 0/ Patent Applications that Include Claims Containing Alternative Language,
Federal Register, Department o/Commerce, August 10th, 2007,923 PUlPat 53 (2008) (discussing
the challenges arising from the use of Markush claims in patent applications).
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pharmaceutical industries. A more restrictive obviousness standard that
benefits the IT industry hinders the pharmaceutical industry and vice
versa. The IT industry is overwhelmed with patents and is in need of a
higher standard for obviousness to counteract the problem. 95 In each
year since 1995, IT companies have comprised the majority of the top
ten organizations in terms of patents granted and for thirteen straight
years, IBM,96 an IT company, has ranked first among non-federal
patenting organizations. 97 In contrast, the pharmaceutical field has
relatively few patents and, due to the importance of each one, needs a
lower obviousness standard to ensure their validity.98 Combination
patents, which stretch the limits of what can be nonobvious, have
particular value to the pharmaceutical field. 99 The health of patent law is
contingent on addressing all of these needs.
A.

THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY NEEDS A
MORE RESTRICTIVE OBVIOUSNESS STANDARD TO
COMBAT THE CURRENT PATENT GLUT AND "PATENT
TROLLS"
The current overpopulation of patents

III

the IT field is stifling

See Clarisa Long, Our Uniform Patent System. 55 FEB. FED. LAW 44 (2008).
IBM is the world's largest infonnation technology company, with over 300,000 employees
and
almost
$1
billion
in
total
annual
revenue
in
2007.
See
ftp://ftp.sofiware.ibm.com/annualreportl200712007_ibm_annual.pdf.
97 See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PRELIMINARY LIST OF Top PATENTING
ORGANIZATIONS DURING THE CALENDAR YEAR, SINGLE YEAR REPORTS, 1991 TO PRESENT,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/reports_top10.htm#TOP_10 (last visited on Mar.
15,2008).
98 See Brief of Amicus Curiae Phannaceutical Research and Manufacturing of America
(PhRMA) in Support of Respondent at 2, eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006)
(No. 05- 130), 2006 WL 622122 ("Given the time and financial expenditures necessary to develop
new drugs, intellectual property principles, especially those involving the protection of patent rights,
are of critical importance to PhRMA members and their research and development efforts. PhRMA
has a strong interest in seeing the law continue to protect those patent rights essential to ensuring
future innovation and the timely development of new medicines. As practitioners in an industry
where research and development are expensive and competition is fierce, PhRMA's members need
strong patent protection to be able to recoup the costs of their investments.").
99 FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY. ch. 3, at I (2003), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/200311 O/innovationrpt.pdf
("Pharmaceutical
and
biotechnology
representatives testified that strong patent protection is essential to innovation in their industries.
Business representatives characterized innovation in these industries as costly and unpredictable,
requiring significant amounts of pioneering research to discover and test new drug products. By
preventing rival finns from free riding on discoveries, patents allow phannaceutical finns to recoup
the substantial capital investments made to discover, test, and obtain regulatory approval of new
drug products.").
9S

96
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innovation. loo As a result of years of the Federal Circuit expanding the
limits of what can be patented, the IT field has reached a point where the
cost of innovation does not primarily come from research and
development, but instead from licensing fees for the use of the numerous
existing patents. 101 It is estimated that if one is "selling online ... there
are 4,319 patents [that the seller] could be violating."lo2 To begin to fix
this situation, the IT field needs a more restrictive obviousness standard
to reduce the amount of patents.
The first cause of this situation is the relatively small investment
needed to develop IT patents relative to other patents, especially
pharmaceutical patents. 103 Although the development of new IT
inventions like new software programs involves both trial and error and
time, it faces little to no quality regulation. Furthermore, there is no need
to synthesize new chemicals or perform clinical trials to demonstrate an
IT invention's efficacy. 104 Consequently, the cost of the average IT
invention is relatively small in comparison to the costs in fields like
pharmaceuticals, which must spend about $800 million per new drug. IDS

100 FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY, executive summary at 6 (2003), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf ("In some industries, such as computer hardware
and software, firms can require access to dozens, hundreds, or even thousands of patents to produce
just one commercial product.").
101 FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY, executive summary, at 6 (2003), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/osI2003/10Iinnovationrpt.pdf ("Many of these patents overlap, with each patent
blocking several others. This tends to create a 'patent thicket' - that is, a 'dense web of overlapping
intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually
commercialize new technology."').
102 JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE How JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS,
AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK, ch. 9 at 15-16 (Princeton University Press 2008),
available at http://researchoninnovation.org/dopatentsworkldopat9.pdf ("The effect of this flood is
apparent in e-commerce patents. David M. Martin estimates that 'if you're selling online, at the
most recent count there are 4,319 patents you could be violating. If you also planned to advertise,
receive payments for or plan shipments of your goods, you would need to be concerned with
approximately 11,000 ... It is no accident that most software users do not clear rights. Checking
thousands of patents is clearly infeasible for almost any software product. Consequently, firms do
not clear their technologies, they inadvertently infringe and costly litigation is the result. "').
103 Clarisa Long. Our Uniform Patent System. 55 FEB. FED. LAW 44, 45 (2008) (discussing
how the cost of much innovation in software industry today is relatively low when compared with
the cost required by other industries).
104 This is distinguished from patents involving technologies like semiconductor fabrication,
which although associated with computer programming, shares research and development issues
with pharmaceuticals, albeit on a lesser scale.
lOS Gregory J. Glover, Statement on Behalf of PhRMA Before the Federal Trade Commission
and the Department of 1ustice-Antitrust Division. Competition in the Pharmaceutical Marketplace,
at 3 (Mar. 19, 2002) (stating that the average cost to develop a new drug is $802 million), available
at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellectl020319gregoryjglover.pdf(last visited on 3/15/2008).
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This relatively low investment in the IT field creates an ideal
environment for "patent trolls," and when other manufacturers wish to
incorporate technology that infringes patents owned by the trolls, they
are often forced to negotiate with the trolls. 106 The dynamic is in stark
contrast to normal patent license negotiations because usually both
parties either have an interest in arriving at a licensing arrangement or
have an interest in maintaining a good business relationship in case they
wish to enter into future licensing arrangements. This is not to say that
all patent owners who do not personally manufacture their patents are
patent trolls, but it illustrates the opportunity for exploitation that is
created by the circumstances, suggesting that in a capitalist economy
such opportunities are frequently exploited.
Indeed, even minimal increase in the number of patent trolls due to
this environment is highly undesirable because it stymies growth by
creating an imbalance of power in negotiations between the
manufacturers and the patent trolls, who do not manufacture and
therefore do not have licensing needs of their own. If a manufacturer
chooses to purchase a license from a patent troll, it increases its cost of
development as well as encouraging claims of infringement by other
parties. On the other hand, if the manufacturer chooses to challenge the
validity of the troll's patent through litigation, it risks losing the ability to
sell its product, essentially resulting in an all-or-nothing situation. This
risk is in addition to the base costs of litigation, which can be millions of
dollars in legal fees, as well as the cost of significant delays to the release
of its invention. t07 This creates a substantial incentive for manufacturers

106 FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLlCY, ch. 2, at 31 (2003), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/IO/innovationrpt.pdf ("[S]ince NPEs [non-practicing entities/patent
trolls] are not vulnerable to an infringement counter attack, MAD [mutually assured destruction]
strategies threatening infringement actions do little to constrain their willingness to seek high royalty
rates from locked-in downstream actors. Thus, NPEs can threaten other firms with patent
infringement actions, which, if successful, could inflict substantial losses, without fear of
retaliation.").
107 FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY, ch. 2, at 29 (2003), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/lOlinnovationrpt.pdf ("If an innovator or producer learns that it has
infringed a patent only after it has committed ... costs to its innovation and production - and thus
locked in to the effort - the patentee may be in a position to demand supra-competitive royalty rates.
If, before lock in, the downstream actor had known about the patent and could have designed its
product or innovation around it, then the firm might have used the opportunity to adopt alternative
designs as leverage for seeking a competitive royalty rate. But after lock in, the downstream actor
no longer has that option. Redesigning a product after significant costs have been sunk may not be
economically viable. And the cost of being preliminarily enjoined is high: as one industry
participant noted, losing a motion for a preliminary injunction in an infringement lawsuit 'would be
detrimental to a firm ifit means shutting down a high-volume manufacturing facility [since the] loss
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to pay for questionable licenses rather than risk total loss, and thereby
increases the cost of product development. Because of this imbalance in
the distribution of financial risk, economics does not encourage
manufacturers to challenge weak patents in court, and therefore a more
restrictive obviousness standard is needed to balance the equation.
The second cause of this patent glut is the incremental nature of IT
development. 108 Numerous small "innovations" are required to develop a
new IT product, and because a less-restrictive obviousness standard
allows each of these "increments" to be patented, the result is a myriad of
patents - often held by numerous different companies - with only slight
variations. 109 Most IT products are built upon obvious combinations of
the prior art and consequently create the need for complicated crosslicensing of existing patents between software developers. Similar to the
patent trolls noted above, this complication stifles innovation by
increasing costs. Each of the patents involved in the product must be
licensed from the owner, compounding the cost of developing a new
product. 110 This particularly hurts smaller upstart companies that lack
their own portfolios of patents or the finances to purchase all the
licenses. III Under what is called "mutually assured destruction,,112
of one week's production alone can cost millions of dollars. "').
108 "[Sjoftware is a cumulative technology, proceeding by sequential innovation. A software
product typically builds on tens or hundreds of previous innovations." Martin Campbell-Kelly, Not
All Bad: An Historical Perspective on Software Patents, II MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv.
191,192 (2005).
109 "Much of this thicket of overlapping patent rights results from the nature of the
technology; computer hardware and software contain an incredibly large number of incremental
innovations. Moreover, as more and more patents issue on incremental inventions, firms seek more
and more patents to have enough bargaining chips to obtain access to others' overlapping patents."
FED. TRADE COMM'N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND
PATENT
LAW
AND
POLICY,
executive
summary
at
6
(2003),
http://www .ftc. gov1os/20031 1O/innovationrpt. pdf.
110 See Clarisa Long, Our Uniform Patent System, 55 FEB. FED. LAW 44, 45 (2008) ("The
Coalition for Patent Fairness-whose members include Apple, Cisco, Microsoft, Sun Microsystems,
Applied Materials, Chevron, Time Warner, and Visa-says, 'These complex cases cost millions in
legal bills and can coerce large settlements that cost upwards of $100 million or much more for
claimed 'inventive contributions' that represent a miniscule part of targeted products.") (illustrating
the possible risks of not incurring the licensing costs while developing a new product and then being
sued for patent infringement).
III FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETlTlON AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY, ch. 3 at 51 nn. 335-336 (2003), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf
(observing that the preparation, filing and
prosecution of a routine patent in the software area costs between $30,000 and $40,000, and that
"although a few thousand dollars may not be a major expense for a large company, it is far too
expensive for many small businesses and independent software developers who cannot even afford
an office").
112 FED. TRADE COMM'N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY, ch. 2 at 30 (2003), available at
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mItigation strategy, larger companies use their own extensive patent
portfolios as bargaining chips in negotiations to lower the cost of
licensing the patents owned by other companies. l13 Essentially, because
each company will likely need to license from the other's patent portfolio
in the future, they both have incentive to operate in good faith and come
to a reasonable amount of royalties for the licenses. 114 This mitigation
method however, leaves small and newly formed companies at a
disadvantage because they do not have large patent portfolios of their
own to offer as a way of balancing the negotiation power and similarly
mitigating the licensing costs. 115 In sum, small companies in the same
mold as Vonage l16 and Akamai Technologies ll7 could be forced out of
the business at an early stage, not because of competition, but because of
the financial burden of cross-licensing several IT patents. Reducing the
number of IT patents is the most efficient way to remedy all these issues,
and this can best be accomplished by raising the standard for
obviousness.
B.

THE PHARMACEUTICAL FIELD NEEDS A LESS
RESTRICTIVE OBVIOUSNESS STANDARD TO BALANCE
OUT ITS COSTS, MAINTAIN THE DIVERSITY OF DRUGS,
AND PROVIDE SECURITY FOR ITS INVESTMENTS

Pharmaceutical patents are on the other end of the patent spectrum.
Due to high costs and the unique value of subtle alterations to existing
drugs, pharmaceutical patents rely heavily on the validity of their
patents. 118 Although an issued patent is presumed to be valid in court, it
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf ("The prospect of mutually assured destruction (or
"MAD") ensures detente, and design freedom, for such firms. Each firm takes into account that, if it
tried to extract excessive royalties or impede the other's innovation efforts through threats of patent
infringement litigation, the other firm could retaliate by suing it for patent infringement and
enjoining its production. This leads the firms to reach licensing agreements with each other, often
portfolio cross-licensing agreements. Such agreements can give each firm the freedom to design and
operate without fear of being sued by the other.").
113

See id.

114

Id.
Id.

115

116 Vonage is a pioneer in the broadband phone industry, setting the standard for pricing,
features, call quality and reliability for the entire VoIP category. http://www.vonage.com (last
visited on Mar. 15,2008).
117 Akamai
Technologies,
Inc.,
http://money. cnn.comlmagazineslhusiness2lh2 fastestgrowingl2007 /snapshots/ I.html (featured as
one of the 100 fastest-growing tech companies, it provides services for accelerating and improving
the delivery of content and applications over the Internet).
118 FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY, ch. 2 at II (2003), available at
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can still be found invalid if it is not sufficiently novel, useful, or
nonobvious. 119 Therefore, due to the high investment costs involved,
pharmaceutical companies have considerable interest in being able to
rely on their issued patent's validity in court. 120 Unlike in the IT field,
the risk of too high a volume of pharmaceutical patents is not a concern.
Many drugs only require four to fifteen patents to be fully protected. 121
Accordingly, ensuring that patents are available, even for what appear to
be simple combinations or modifications, is vital even to a brand-name
pharmaceutical company's survival. 122 New drug development can
easily cost over one hundred million dollars in research and
development, and, therefore, to balance out this investment, drug
companies need to be sure that their research will produce nonobvious
and therefore patentable drugS. 123 Also unlike in the IT industry, the
http://www.ftc.gov/osI2003110/innovationrpt.pdf ("[The] phannaceutical industry partIcIpants
reported that 60% of inventions would not have been developed and 65% would not have been
commercially introduced absent patent protection."); see also id. at I ("Phannaceutical companies,
for example, rely on patents to prevent free riding, recoup their R&D investments, and learn about
new technological breakthroughs, according to many panelists.").
119 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1952).
120 Although patents issued by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office are presumed to be valid
in court, this presumption is rebuttable and the court can still find a patent invalid upon submission
of sufficient evidence. KSR In!'1 Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1737 (2007); 35 U.S.C. § 282
(2002).
121 FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY, ch. 3 at 5-6 (2003), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003110/innovationrpt.pdf ("The low number of patents contained in a
phannaceutical product means that, as panelists noted, the development of patent thickets is
generally not a concern.").
122 See FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY, ch. 3 at 8 (2003), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/IO/innovationrpt.pdf ("The other main type of innovation in the
phannaceutical industry consists of enhancing known chemical entities by fonnulating new dosage
fonns or additional methods of use for existing chemical entities. This type of innovation is
generally described as incremental, which, in general tenns, means that today's advances build on
and interact with many other features of existing technology. In the phannaceutical industry,
incremental innovation generally faUs into one of three categories. The modified product may use a
new formulation, such as a transdennal patch instead of a pill, may combine two previously
approved active ingredients, or may use a new salt or ester, which is a more purified form of the
original chemical entity. Several panelists suggested that brand-name companies have responded to
effective patent tenn reduction and the increasing cost of discovering and developing [new chemical
entities (hereinafter "NCE")] by implementing product life-cycle management, including the use of
[incrementally modified drugs (hereinafter "IMD")]. Some have noted that IMDs provide a high
return on investment.") (internal citations omitted). An IMD is an "incrementally modified drug," or
in other words a small improvement on an existing drug line. FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE
INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY, ch. 3 at 6 n.
12 (2003), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf.
123 FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY, ch. 3 at 5 (2003), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf
(stating that "discoveries typically require
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phannaceutical industry has little to fear from "patent trolls" because the
high costs of research and development and low quantity of patents in the
field make trolling behavior significantly less profitable. 124 Moreover,
unlike small product changes in other fields, in the phannaceutical field a
wide range of slightly different drugs with the same effect can be
particularly beneficial to consumers. 125
If a high standard for
obviousness is utilized, the patentability of these slightly different drugs
will become both unpredictable and increasingly costly, and will
ultimately cause phannaceutical companies to struggle to maintain their
Accordingly, the health of phannaceutical
financial stability. 126
companies is contingent on a lenient obviousness standard. \27

significant amounts of pioneering research, and both fixed costs and risks of failing to develop a
marketable product, consequently, are very high. Brand-name companies spend a substantial
amount in development costs over the course of 10 to 15 years to bring a product involving an NCE
to market from the initial research stage. The brand-name companies' trade association reports that
most newly marketed drugs do not cover their average development costs."}.
124 Jeremiah S. Helm, Why Pharmaceutical Firms Support Patent Trolls: The Disparate
Impact of Ebay v. MercExchange on Innovation, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 331, 339
(Fall 2006) ("The main reason for the pharmaceutical industry'S interest in preserving the automatic
injunction rule set out by the Federal Circuit stems from the difference between typical products in
the pharmaceutical and information technology industries. Whereas a firm like eBay utilizes a
number of different patents in its product, thus giving rise to the opportunity for a troll to extract
more than the actual value of a patent, a pharmaceutical firm can ensure market exclusivity for a
drug with a single patent on the active molecule.").
125 FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY, ch. 3 at 8-9 (2003), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf ("IMDs benefit consumers by providing more
convenient dosing or 'superior therapeutic properties than the original formulation,' or by serving
certain patient populations better than the original product. The brand-name companies' trade
association stated that if physicians and consumers choose IMDs in preference to generic
alternatives of the original brand-name product, the modified drug is warranted.").
126 FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY, ch. 3 at II (2003), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf ("By removing obstacles to generic competition,
the Hatch-Waxman Amendments (also known as the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act (Public Law 98-417,98 Stat. 1585 (1984}), codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355 and 35
U.S.C. 156 & 271) stimulated the development of a generic pharmaceutical industry in the United
States. Since the law's passage, the generic industry's share of the prescription drug market has
jumped from less than 20 percent to almost 50 percent today. The Hatch-Waxman Amendments
have fostered significant price competition in those markets with generic entry. The generic
competition spurred by Hatch-Waxman has forced brand-name firms to come up with new products
to replenish their revenue streams. Brand name companies often have introduced lMDs for which
they can seek patent protection to lessen the impact of this generic competition."} (internal quotation
marks omitted).
127 Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law, /9002000,88 CAL. L. REV. 2187,2226 (2000) ("[E]conomic models suggest that lowering the standard
of patentability for high-cost research projects makes economic sense. The Federal Circuit seems to
have reached much the same intuition so far with respect to biotechnology inventions."); Id. at 222526 ("In certain cases, the skilled inventor might have predicted technical success, but the cost of
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Drug development is expensive because of (1) the unpredictability
of the science, (2) the increasingly stringent tests administered by the
FDA that new drugs must pass before they can be marketed to the public,
and (3) the general economic factors that reward investment in
confronting complex viruses with "blockbuster drugS.,,128 Unlike IT
areas, such as programming, the chemistry behind pharmaceutical
patents remains an inexact science. 129 Often what appear to be simple
combinations produce unexpected results, and slight alterations can have
dramatic effects on a drug's performance. l3O As a result, drug companies
must take broad approaches to solving problems, expending money to
explore every avenue because the solution can often come from an
unexpected route. 131 Costs are thereby increased due to the breadth of
research undertaken and the need to take journeys down errant paths that,
132
in a more predictable art, would be identified earlier as dead ends.
Additionally, the substantial risk of harming humans that drugs pose
has resulted in ever-increasing regulations by the FDA before a drug can
be marketed to the public. 133
These FDA standards slow the

conducting the key experiment was very high. Courts have at times seen this as a deciding factor,
holding in effect that high-cost research justifies a less stringent standard of purely technical
nonobviousness.").
128 "Blockbuster" drugs, such as Lipitor or Viagra, are drugs that due to the large market
demand are worth billions in profits. See, e.g., NAT'L INST. FOR HEALTH CARE MGMT. REs. &
EDUC. FOUND., CHANGING PATTERNS OF PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION 16 (May 28, 2002),
available at http://www.nihcm.org/-nihcmor/pdf/innovations.pdf.
129 Stephen G. Kunin & Andrew K. Beverina, Commentary, KSR's Effect on Patent Law, 106
MICH.
L.
REv.
FIRST
IMPRESSIONS
50,
51
(2007),
available
at
http://www.michiganlawreview.orglfirstimpressions/voll 06lkuninbeverina.pdf
("[Clhemical
inventions may involve only minor structural differences over the prior art and yet still produce
unexpected results.").
130

Ed.

FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY, ch. 3 at 5 (2003), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/IO/innovationrpt.pdf ("[D]iscoveries typically require significant
amounts of pioneering research, and both fixed costs and risks of failing to develop a marketable
product, consequently, are very high. Brand-name companies spend a substantial amount in
development costs over the course of 10 to 15 years to bring a product involving an NCE [new
chemical entity] to market from the initial research stage. The brand-name companies' trade
association reports that most newly marketed drugs do not cover their average development costs.
Brand name companies typically rely on a small number of 'blockbuster' drugs to recoup their
overall investment in innovation, including R&D costs for failed products.").
132 Ed. at 4-6.
131

133 FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY, ch. 3 at 6 (2003), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf (citing tuFTS CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF DRUG
DEVELOPMENT, How NEW DRUGS MOVE THROUGH THE DEVELOPMENT AND ApPROVAL PROCESS
(2001), available at http://csdd.tufts.edulNewsEventslRecentNews.asp?newsid= 4) ("Three phases
of clinical testing then follow, which the drug sponsoring company undertakes and the FDA's Center
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development of new drugs by requiring that they endure long trial
periods as well as increasing the overall new drug failure rates because
the standards require the drugs to meet a very high safety level. 134
Consequently, it takes an average of over thirteen years to develop a
drug, and only one out of every 10,000 tested molecular combinations
("drugs") goes on to be marketed. 135 Compounding the problem, this
added testing and FDA approval process also shortens the time
pharmaceutical companies have to sell the drugs under patent
protection. 136 Owners of other types of patents can immediately begin
reaping the profits of their investment in the patent for the full twentyyear grant, whereas pharmaceutical companies can often lose three or
more years of their grant waiting for the drug to be approved by the
FDA. 137 Congress attempted to address this inequity with the Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act,138 but even with its patent
term extension provisions, the effective marketable term of a drug patent
is only about eleven years.139 Therefore, the FDA regulations both
increase costs and lower profits for drug patents.
Moreover, economic demands also contribute to the cost of drug
research and development. The economic reality for pharmaceutical
companies is that they must choose between primarily developing new
molecular elements (hereinafter "NME"), which are not related to any
for Drug Evaluation and Research oversees. Brand-name companies conduct Phase I clinical studies
on healthy human beings to determine side effects and gather preliminary evidence of effectiveness.
Phase II studies 'are designed to obtain data on the effectiveness of the drug for a particular
indication or indications in patients with the disease or condition.' Phase III studies are expanded
controlled and uncontrolled trials and can involve thousands of patients. These clinical trials are
often very resource and time-intensive.").
134 Id.; FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY, ch. 3, at 6 (2003), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf ("In general, the brand-name companies' trade
association reported [that] only 20 in 5,000 compounds that are screened enter preclinical testing,
which involves laboratory and animal testing.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
135 U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-49, NEW DRUG DEVELOPMENT, at I
(2006).
136 Despite the Hatch-Waxman Amendment [21 U.S.C. § 355], which restores up to five years
of patent lifetime lost due to the clinical testing process, the "[p ]harmaceutical companies report,
however, that by the time clinical trials are complete and a drug product is ready to market, the
effective patent life for a drug patent - even with patent term restoration - is typically about II
years, substantially shorter than the 20-year statutory patent term." FED. TRADE COMM'N, To
PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY,
ch.3 at 7 (2003), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf.
137

Id.

35 U.S.C. § 156 (2002); see also Manual of Patent Examining Proceedure § 2753.
See FED. TRADE COMM'N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY, ch. 3 at 7 (2003), available at
138

139

http://www.ftc.gov1os/2 003/1 O/innovationrpt. pdf.
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existing drugs and are often needed to combat more complex viruses
(e.g., AIDS, cancer), or developing drugs that are similar to existing
drugs and are therefore less of a risk, but not necessarily as beneficial to
society. 140 If the pharmaceutical companies choose to combat complex
viruses by developing NMEs, they face an uphill battle with a high
reward, but an equally high chance of failure. 141 On the other hand, if
they choose to develop variations on existing drugs, which due to their
marketability have a low risk of failure, they simultaneously risk being
beaten by numerous other companies racing toward the same goal. 142
Both avenues share high costs and contribute to the overall cost of
research and development.
Indeed, due to the uncertainty, high
standards, and economic demands, drug development costs will continue
to stay high, and a less restrictive obviousness standard is needed to
stabilize this investment.
Pharmaceutical patents also need a less restrictive obviousness
standard because of the unique value of slightly variant drugs to
pharmaceutical companies and the public. 143 Having a diverse selection
of drugs to match the diversity of people provides both physicians and
individuals with a range of options. For example, many different drugs
designed to lower cholesterol and to combat depression can have similar
molecular compositions and active ingredients, but they can also have
different measures of success and/or side effects on different
individuals. 144 Therefore, if a drug that successfully treats one patient
140 FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY, ch. 3 at 4 (2003), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf ("R&D in the pharmaceutical industry generally
produces two main types of innovation: (I) discrete innovation, which means, in general terms, that
the invention might be improved, but does not point the way to wide-ranging, subsequent discoveries
of new chemical entities (NCEs); and (2) incremental innovation, which describes the development
of improvements to existing drug products, often referred to as product line-extensions [also known
as "me too" drugs].").
141 See FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION
AND
PATENT
LAW
AND
POLICY,
ch.
3
at
4-9
(2003),
http://www .ftc.gov/os/2003/ I O/innovationrpt.pdf.
142
1d.
143 Some commentators argue that slightly variant drugs are harmful to innovation because
they block the introduction of cheaper generic drugs; however, "assuming these 'me too' drugs are
obvious over the first drug, then there is a strong chance they infringe the first drug patent,
preserving its market power. Further, if the 'me too' drugs are not major advances, market power in
the first drug is not prolonged by obtaining patents on the 'me too' drugs, because people will just
use the first drug when its patent expires instead of using the pricier 'me too' drugs that don't do
much
more."
Posting
of
Joe
Smith
to
PatentlyO,
http://www.patentlyo.com!patentl2007/03/routine_experim.html (Mar. 27, 2007, 12:34 PST).
144 U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REpORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS:NEW
DRUG
DEVELOPMENT,
GAO-07-49
at
29
(Nov.
2006),
available
at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0749.pdf(''[C]ompanies have produced different drugs all designed
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has ill effects on another, the patient can tum to a slight variant on that
drug. Similarly, if an individual becomes resistant to the principal form
of a drug, slightly variant drugs provide an alternative. 145 Furthermore,
the creation of these similar drugs has the added effect of creating more
competition in the marketplace, which results in lower prices for
consumers. 146 This diversity would be crippled if a more restrictive
obviousness standard were applied, damaging both the pharmaceutical
industry and the general public.
A less restrictive standard for obviousness is the most efficient way
to ensure that pharmaceutical companies are compensated for the large
investment required to develop a new drug. Pharmaceutical companies
have less incentive for continued research if there is a high obviousness
standard because they know it will be difficult to obtain the type of
patents that result from the research. Also, the certainty that a less
restrictive obviousness standard would provide permits pharmaceutical
companies to invest in drugs that are borderline obvious but still valuable
to the public. Without a less restrictive obviousness standard, research in
derivative drugs would decrease and the public would suffer due to
decreased drug variations. A less restrictive obviousness standard allows
the pharmaceutical industry to better serve the public while enabling
continued profitability.
III. A SINGLE STANDARD FOR OBVIOUSNESS CANNOT
EFFECTIVEL Y ADDRESS BOTH INDUSTRIES' NEEDS
SIMULTANEOUSLY
Given the inverse nature of the needs of the IT and pharmaceutical
industries, a single standard cannot effectively address both. If a single
less restrictive obviousness standard is used, although the pharmaceutical
industry is benefited, the result is an overcrowded IT sector. 147 This
to combat depression or reduce cholesterol, and that such 'me too' drugs have similar therapeutic
benefits ... However, industry analysts report that 'me too' drugs benefit consumers by offering
alternative and safer therapies. For example, they indicate that the side effects and efficacy of these
drugs can vary from person to person, which gives physicians more options in treating their
patients."}.
145 See id.
U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REpORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS:NEW
DEVELOPMENT,
GAO-07-49
at
29
(Nov.
2006),
available
at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0749.pdf ("In addition, analysts report that 'me too' drugs increase
competition, which can lower the price of drugs in the market.").
147 The pre-KSR state of the patent system is an example of the consequences of a low
obviousness standard. As the IT sector was clamoring for a higher obviousness standard, the
pharmaceutical industry did not want what was the current obviousness standard to change. See
Brief of Altitude Capital Partners, Expanse Networks, Inc., Inflexion Point Strategy, LLC,
146

DRUG
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patent overpopulation suffocates innovation in a field where little
incentive is needed to drive progress. Contrarily, if there is a single more
restrictive obviousness standard, while benefiting the IT sector,
pharmaceutical companies are forced to adjust their investments to
reflect the probability their inventions will be found obvious. 148 This will

Interdigital Communications Corp., Ipotential, LLC, Ocean Torno, LLC, and Onspec Electronic Inc.
as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007)
(No. 04-1350), 2006 WL 2950623; Brief of the United Inventors Association as Amicus Curiae in
Support of the Respondents, KSR Int'I Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) (No. 04-1350),
2006 WL 2967755; Brief of Amicus Curiae Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America
in Support of Respondents, KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) (No. 04- 1350),
2006 WL 2967758; Brief of the United Inventors Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of the
Respondents, KSR Int'I Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) (No. 04-1350), 2006 WL
2967758; Brief of Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation, Regents of the University of California,
Board of Regents of the University of Texas System, Washington Research Foundation, Science and
Technology Corporation @ UNM, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, and Research Corporation
Technologies, Inc. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127
S. Ct. 1727 (2007) (No. 04-1350), 2006 WL 2967759; Brief for Technology Properties Limited as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) (No.
04-1350),2006 WL 2983160; Brief Amici Curiae of Michelin North America, Inc., ArvinMeritor,
Inc., and Nartron Corporation in Support of Respondent, KSR Int'I Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct.
1727 (2007) (No. 04-1350), 2006 WL 2983162; Brief of Tessera, Inc., Qualcomm Inc., and
AmberWave Systems Corporation as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, KSR Int'I Co. v.
Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) (No. 04-1350),2006 WL 2983163; Brief of Biotechnology
Industry Organization as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,
127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) (No. 04-\350), 2006 WL 2983166; Brieffor Amici Curiae 3M Co., General
Electric Co., Procter & Gamble Co., E.!. DuPont de Nemours and Co., and Johnson & Johnson in
Support of Respondents, KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) (No. 04-1350), 2006
WL 3004029; Brief of Fallbrook Technologies, Inc.; Intellectual Ventures; Ellsworth International,
Inc.; GE02 Technologies, Inc.; Mobile Productivity, Inc.; Composite Technology International, Inc.;
Skyler Technology, Inc.; Private Management, Inc.; Technology, Patents & Licensing, Inc.; and
Intermune, Inc. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, KSR Int'I Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S.
Ct. 1727 (2007) (No. 04-1350), 2006 WL 3004030; Brief for Amici Curiae Time Warner Inc.,
IAC/lnteractive Corp., and Viacom, Inc. in Support of Petitioner, KSR Int'I Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127
S. Ct. 1727 (2007) (No. 04-1350), 2006 WL 2452363; Brief for Amicus Curiae Computer &
Communications Industry Association in Support of Petitioner, KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127
S. Ct. 1727 (2007) (No. 04-1350), 2006 WL 2452364; Brief of Amici Curiae Cisco Systems Inc.,
General Motors Corporation, Hallmark Cards, Incorporated, Fortune Brands Inc. and Electrolux
North America in Support of Reversal, KSR Int'I Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) (No.
04-1350),2006 WL 2452365; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
KSR Int'I Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) (No. 04-1350), 2006 WL 2453601; Brief
Amici Curiae of Ford Motor Company and DaimlerChrysler Corporation in Support of Neither
Party, KSR Int'I Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) (No. 04-1350), 2006 WL 2453603;
Brief of Intel Corporation and Micron Technology, Inc. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner,
KSR Int'1 Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) (No. 04-1350), 2006 WL 2453606; Brief of
Amicus Curiae International Business Machines Corporation in Support of Neither Party, KSR Int'I
Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) (No. 04-1350),2006 WL 2430566.
148 FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY, ch. 2 at 11 (2003), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/lOlinnovationrpt.pdf ("[P]harmaceutical industry participants reported
that 60% of inventions would not have been developed and 65% would not have been commercially
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discourage the development of new drugs that are not certain to pass the
more restrictive obviousness standard and limit the selection of drugs
available to the public. Clearly, both these situations are less than ideal.
There are only two ways to stretch a single standard to fit the needs
of both the IT and pharmaceutical industries, and both are inadequate.
The first way is to apply the standard differently depending on the type
of patent. However, with such polar needs, this "stretching" of the
standard results in one so amorphous that it is difficult to apply
uniformly, thereby causing confusion and unpredictability in the
industry. 149 Anytime the law governing an industry is confusing or
unpredictable it causes companies to shy away from investment in that
industry and impedes its growth. 150 Conversely, the second way to
stretch a single standard is to maintain a definite standard, keeping it
easy to apply, but producing undesired results in differing industries
whose needs do not mesh with the single definite standard's effects.
Previously, this second option of maintaining a single definite
standard was largely the strategy taken by the Federal Circuit with its
implementation of the TSM test, because the first option is
unmanageable and therefore impractical. I51 Predictably, however, it has
resulted in the current undesired IT patent glut because the IT industry's
needs do not mesh with the TSM test's effects. 152 By choosing to
maintain a single definite standard, the Federal Circuit avoided the first
option's difficulty with application and predictability, but was forced to
choose between a less or more restrictive obviousness standard.
Accordingly, the Court settled for a less restrictive standard that
conflicted with the IT industry's needs. 153
introduced absent patent protection. ").
149 The effects of this "stretching" were illustrated by the court's application of the Graham
factors before the implementation of the TSM test. See Lee Petherbridge & R. Polk Wagner, The
Federal Circuit and Patentability: An Empirical Assessment 0/ the Law 0/ Obviousness, 85 TEX. L.
REv. 2051,2057 (2007) (citing S. REP. No. 97-275, at 5 (1981), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
II, 15 ("[P]atent law [is] an area in which the application of the law to the facts of a case often
produces different outcomes in different courtrooms in substantially similar cases."); see also S.
REp. No. 97-275, at 3-6 (1981), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. II, 13-16 (discussing reports that
forum shopping was common to patent litigation».
150 "It was clear that patents could never serve as reliable investment incentives when their
fate in the courts was so unpredictable, and the judicial attitude in general so hostile." Pauline
Newman, Origins o/the Federal Circuit: The Role o/Industry, II FED. OR. BJ. 541, 542 (2001).
151
Id.
152 See FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY, executive summary at 6 (2003),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf.
153 "This test, designed largely to combat hindsight bias and to create predictability in patent
decisions, led to questions about patent overissuance." The Supreme Court 2006 Term Leading
Cases, 121 HARV. L. REv. 375, 376 (2007).
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In KSR, the Supreme Court held that the Federal Circuit needs to
adjust the TSM test such that the test considers common sense in its
obviousness determination. 154 However, this new holding only creates
another definite standard under the second option described above, but
with a more restrictive standard than that previously settled on by the
Federal Circuit. Although this will address the needs of the IT industry,
it will conflict with the needs of the pharmaceutical industry, the ultimate
result being a future unhealthy pharmaceutical industry similar to the
currently unhealthy IT industry. Indeed, as long as a single standard
under the second option is utilized, the standard will still need to
continually swing from strict to lenient as each disadvantaged field
reaches a point of enough loss to compel the Supreme Court to revise the
standard.
This solution is inefficient. Each time the standard changes, a
transition period begins, with inefficiencies in both fields as the
industries adjust. If the switch is from a less strict standard to a very
strict standard, as was the effect of the KSR ruling, the result is a copious
number of questionable patents. This is because patents in both fields
that were valid under the less strict standard now would have
questionable validity under the new strict standard. Litigation is the
main way to remove these questionable patents, and it comes with a high
cost, ranging on average from $650,000 to $4,500,000. 155
If the switch is from a high to low standard, similar inefficiency
occurs. In this situation, both the IT and pharmaceutical fields race to
patent what would have been obvious previously.
Instead of
concentrating on creating new technologies, companies would need to
focus on getting "defensive patents"l56 to prevent patent trolls and protect
154 "The obviousness analysis cannot be confined by a formalistic conception of the words
teaching, suggestion, and motivation, or by overemphasis on the importance of published articles
and the explicit content of issued patents ... when a court transforms the general principle into a
rigid rule that limits the obviousness inquiry, as the Court of Appeals did here, it errs .... Common
sense teaches, however, that familiar items may have obvious uses beyond their primary purposes,
and in many cases a person of ordinary skill will be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents
together like pieces ofa puzzle." KSR In!'1 Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1741-42 (2007).
155 Marc J. Pensabene & Thomas S. Gabriel, To Sue Or Not To Sue: Risks of Unlocking Value
Through Patent Litigation, 19 No.9 IPTLJ 18,21 (2007) (citing AIPLA Report of the Economic
Survey 2005 at 22 (AIPLA, Arlington, Va.) (analyzing average patent litigation expenses; range of
$350,000 in fees for a simple patent case to over $3,000,000 for a more complex case, with a total
cost ranging from $650,000 to $4,500,000)).
156 "Defensive patents" are patents that are similar to a principal patent intended for use in a
product, that are not themselves obtained to be incorporated into the owner's products, but are
utilized as a way of blocking other companies and or patent trolls from obtaining those patents and
then suing the owner for its use of the principal patent. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE
INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLlCY, executive
summary at 6 (2003), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf.
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their products. 15 ?
In either situation there are costs that hinder
innovation, and the costs must be incurred again and again as the cycle
continues. Each switch is not a solution, but instead simply resets the
clock until the patent field reaches another unhealthy state. A long-term
solution is needed.
IV. A SEPARATE OBVIOUSNESS STANDARD TAILORED TO
THE NEEDS OF BOTH INDUSTRIES IS THE MOST EFFICIENT
LONGTERM SOLUTION
By giving separate consideration to the needs of the pharmaceutical
and IT industries and creating individual obviousness standards, the
Supreme Court and Federal Circuit can fashion a solution that allows
both industries to operate in ideal conditions and capitalize on their full
potential. Unlike previous solutions, individual standards will be capable
of addressing both the IT and pharmaceutical industries' needs
concurrently while still maintaining a clear definition. As a result, the
courts will be able to easily determine which standard applies in each
case, as well as consistently and uniformly administer the appropriate
standard. All this can be achieved with a minimal cost that principally
arises out of a one-time adjustment period, as opposed to the recurring
costs that arise from solutions that are inadequate in the long term. By
acknowledging that the IT and pharmaceutical industries have
incompatible needs that must be individually addressed, a beneficial,
administrable, and efficient long-term solution is possible.
A.

A DUAL STANDARD OBVIOUSNESS SOLUTION CAN
ADDRESS THE INDUSTRIES' CONFLICTING NEEDS - AND
BE COMPATIBLE WITH PROPOSED LEGISLATION WITHOUT SACRIFICING APPLICABILITY

As long as the industries have incompatible needs, a dual standard
solution for what is obvious will always have a key advantage over a
single standard. Because of the nature of the circumstances surrounding
our patent system, a single standard cannot address the diverging needs
of both industries while being unambiguous and easy to apply. The more
vague the standard is, the more it can stretch to address both industries'
needs, but the harder it becomes to apply consistently. The less vague
the standard is, the easier it is to apply, but the more it ignores the needs
157 /d. at 6-7 ("One panelist asserted that the time and money his software company spends on
creating and filing these so-called defensive patents, which 'have no ... innovative value in and of
themselves,' could have been better spent on developing new technologies.").

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2008

31

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 1 [2008], Art. 3

102

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

of one of the industries.
A dual standard, on the other hand, can address the needs of both
while maintaining its applicability. The dual standards would address
both the needs of the IT industry and the needs of the pharmaceutical
industry because the two standards would be created with the relevant
needs in mind. Furthermore, dual standards can accomplish this without
sacrificing applicability. Each standard could be thoroughly defined so
as to address one industry'S set of problems, while providing ample
detail regarding how it should be applied. Accordingly, using a dual
standard allows the wording of each to be simple and easy for the courts
to apply consistently.
A dual standard also has the advantage of both encouraging and
being compatible with the current proposed patent legislation. None of
the proposed provisions in the current version of the Patent Reform Act including the first-to-file system, new infringement damages
calculations, and third-party prior art submissions discussed above would be incompatible with two separate standards for obviousness,
because they are not contingent on the type or number of obviousness
standards applied. 158 Indeed, by creating a solution that addresses the
needs of both industries, a dual standard may actually help Congress
come to an agreeable compromise regarding other areas of patent law
needing reform. It is likely that having the comfort of knowing there is a
predictable obviousness standard in place to protect their needs, the IT
and pharmaceutical industry lobbyists will be more willing to negotiate
on other matters such as those being currently debated in the 2007 Patent
Reform ACt. 159 As it stands, the lobbyists for the industries that the
current single standard solution neglects are more likely to be inflexible
in their positions because, without an obviousness standard that
addresses their needs, they can ill afford to compromise their positions
further in other areas.

See Patent Reform Act, H.R. 1908, I 10th Congo (2007).
Although the 2007 version of the Patent Reform Act was passed by the House of
Representative on September 7, 2007 (H.R. 1908, Ii0th Congo (2007), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibinlgetdoc.cgi?dbname=110_con~bills&docid=f:hI908eh.txt.pdt), it still faces stiff opposition in
the Senate as illustrated by a letter to Senate Majority Leader Reid and Senate Minority Leader
McConnell, on behalf of more than 430 organizations raising continuing concerns regarding the
of
the
act,
S.
1145
("Patent
Reform
Act"),
available
at
terms
http://www.thelen.comlresources/documents/G430_Senate_Letter.pdf.
158

159
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THE COST OF IMPLEMENTING A DUAL STANDARD
SOLUTION IS COMPARABLE TO THE COST OF THE
CURRENT SOLUTION WHILE OFFERING THE ADV ANT AGE
OF LONG-TERM EFFECTIVENESS

As with all doctrinal changes, there will be some initial inefficiency
and costs involved in switching to a dual standard solution. However,
these costs will be far outweighed by the healthy returns for the patent
system. The principal costs of using two standards include (1) adjusting
the industries to the new standard and (2) determining which of the
standards applies to any given case. Each of these costs, however, either
is balanced by an equal or greater cost of implementing alternative
solutions or is relatively minimal when considering the potential benefit.

1.

The Adjustment Cost Associated with a Change to the Obviousness
Standard Will Be Less With a Dual Standard Solution Than With a
Single Standard Solution

One of two costs will always be incurred when there are changes to
the obviousness standard. If the change if from a low standard to a high
standard, the cost of determining what patents are valid under the new
higher standard is incurred. If the change is from a high standard to a
low standard, the cost of defending one's patents against formerly
obvious slight alterations to the patent that might curtail the original
patent's use is incurred. In the case of a switch from a less strict to a
very strict standard, patents that do not meet that standard are "bad
patents,,160 because, by not meeting the ideal level, they hinder
innovation. 161 As a result, there is little justification for grandfathering
them under the previous standard. Thus, a switch from a less strict
standard to a very strict standard will likely lead to increased litigation;
the limits of the new standard will have to be tested to determine which
previously existing patents meet the new standard.
In the case of a switch from a very strict to a less strict standard,
although none of the current patents is called into question, it creates
space for the patenting of slight variations of patented inventions, which
160 Jason Rantanen, Slaying the Troll: Litigation as an Effective Strategy Against Patent
Threats, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.1. 159, 166 (2006) ("Bad patents are a

commonly recognized problem, and there is significant evidence that such patents deter
innovation.").
161 Bad patents hinder innovation because, in theory, the new standard is placed at an ideal
level to promote innovation for the industries that need a strict standard. See Universal Oil Prods.
Co. v. Globe Oil & Ref. Co., 322 U.s. 471, 484 (1944); see also Earl W. Kintner & Jack L. Lahr, AN
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW PRIMER 7-11 (2d ed. 1982); 35 U.s.C. § 101 (1952).
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if acquired by a competitor or a patent troll, could be used against the
original patent owner to demand royalties. 162 This leads to companies
expending time and effort filing "defensive patents,,163 to prevent others
from impeding their current patents. 164 A dual standard is no exception
to these costs, but it minimizes the effect compared to single standard
solutions.
The cost incurred by the patent industries and the court system by
switching to a dual standard will be proportional to the amount the
obviousness standard needs to be adjusted. Greater adjustment means
greater costs, because there will be either a larger number of questionable
patents or a larger number of formerly obvious patents that will be
subject to "defensive patenting." Therefore, when the standard is
changed from less strict to very strict, as the Supreme Court did recently
with its ruling in KSR, a substantial cost is incurred as the industry
adjusts. 165 Though likely exaggerated, these possible ramifications were
discussed in the KSR amicus briefs presented by the pharmaceutical
industry. 166
Unlike a single standard, however, a dual standard minimizes this
cost by only changing the standard for one of the industries. For
example, compared to the KSR low-to-high standard switch, a dual
162 FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY ch. 2, at 31 (2003), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/IOlinnovationrpt.pdf(''Since NPEs [non-practicing entities/patent trolls]
are not vulnerable to an infringement counter attack, MAD [mutually assured destruction] strategies
threatening infringement actions do little to constrain their willingness to seek high royalty rates
from locked-in downstream actors. Thus, NPEs can threaten other firms with patent infringement
actions, which, if successful, could inflict substantial losses, without fear of retaliation.").
163 "Defensive patents" are patents filed by companies not because they intend to manufacture
what is described in the patent, but because the patent is similar to another patent that they do
manufacture and they want to create a legal buffer around the invention by patenting all devices that
are closely similar to it. Additionally, a defensive patent can be used "(I) to maintain detente with
rivals; (2) to obtain portfolio cross-licenses from rivals; and (3) to raise a patent infringement
counter-claim should a rival sue a firm for patent infringement." [d. at ch. 3, at 52.
164 Because of the importance of protecting their current patents, many "companies may have
to divert resources from R&D to fund their defensive patent programs ... reallocat[ing] roughly 20
to 35 percent of their developer's resources and sign on two separate law firms to increase their
patent portfolio for purely defensive reasons." [d. at ch. 3, at 52-53.
165 These likely consequences of a change from a low to a high obviousness standard were
summarized by PhRMA (a group consisting of numerous leading companies in the pharmaceutical
industry) stating that "[s]uch an undesirable change in the law will significantly undermine the
confidence of innovators ... in their ability to enforce patents against free-riding infringers who use
the fruits of research and clinical-testing efforts of [companies] without incurring the costly expenses
associated with developing, testing, and obtaining approval of new drug products." Brief of Amicus
Curiae Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America in Support of Respondents at 3,
KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) (No. 04- I 350), available at 2006 WL
2967758.
166

[d.
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standard would change the definition of obviousness only for the IT
industry, leaving the less strict standard for the pharmaceutical industry
unchanged. The result is an obviousness standard change for fewer
patents - only the IT industry - and therefore less cost. Similarly, a
high-to-Iow standard switch would also require a standard change only
for the pharmaceutical industry and would therefore involve less cost.
Consequently, although a dual standard still involves some costs of
adjustment, when compared to a single standard, the cost of adjustment
will always be less. A concrete single standard solution neglects one of
the industries and must be periodically adjusted once that industry
reaches a point where innovation is being substantially stifled. A vague
single standard is so difficult to apply that it must be periodically
redefined to combat inconsistent application. A dual standard, however,
only requires an adjustment cost once because it does not neglect a patent
system nor is it hard to apply.

2.

The Cost of Determining Which of the Dual Standards Applies Will
Be Minimal Due to the General Distinctiveness of Pharmaceutical
Patents and Distinctions Already Being Made

The second main cost of a dual standard solution is the effort
required to determine which standard applies to each situation. Unlike a
single standard solution that applies to every situation, with a dual
standard the courts must determine what qualifies as a pharmaceutical
patent and what qualifies as an IT patent. The cost necessitated by this
need to differentiate depends on the distinctiveness of the categories.
Generally, when categories are more distinct it takes less effort to
categorize them and apply the correct standard. Luckily, the inherent
distinctiveness of pharmaceutical patents combined with differentiating
rules already simplifies this determination, which minimizes cost.
Pharmaceutical patents are inherently distinctive because of a drug's
molecular nature. 167 Unlike many other types of patents, pharmaceutical
patents describe innovations made on a molecular level. 168 Instead of
using materials to create moving parts like a mechanical patent, or as a
platform to perform complex Boolean logic 169 like a computer program

167 See Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 321(g), available at
http://www.fda.gov/opacomllaws/fdcactlfdcactl.htm.
168

[d.

169 Boolean is defined as "of, related to, or being a logical combinatorial system that
represents symbolically relationships (as those implied by the logical operators AND, OR, and NOT)
between entities (as sets, propositions, or on-off computer circuit elements)." WEBSTERS' NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2002). Boolean logic is a type of logic that can be used in the
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patent, pharmaceutical patents involve the design of a material itself and
thereby are easily distinguishable from other types of patents. 170
Accordingly, it is easy to distinguish pharmaceutical elements from IT
elements even in patents that incorporate both. For example, if a patent
is sought for a computer program that describes the makeup of a drug, a
high standard would be used to test the computer program for
obviousness, regardless of what it described, and a low standard would
be used to test the drug itself for obviousness, regardless of the medium in this hypothetical a computer program - used to describe it. Thus, the
cost of determining the applicable standard can first be minimized by
easily disqualifying any patent that does not deal with molecular
makeup.
Another way to distinguish pharmaceutical patents is to utilize rules
already in place that are designed to distinguish pharmaceutical patents
from other patents for the purpose of regulation and patent term
extension. First, as discussed above, the FDA reviews all pharmaceutical
drug patents to ensure their quality and safety.171 This requires that they
distinguish pharmaceutical patents from all other patents. l72 Therefore,
one way to distinguish pharmaceutical patents would be to either use the
definition already being applied by the FDA 173 or to reference the drugs
listed in the "Orange Book.,,174 And because this categorization of all
creation of computer software and hardware.
170 See Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 321(g) (2007), available at
http://www.fda.gov/opacom/laws/fdcactlfdcactl.htm.
171 See Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21
U.S.C. § 355, available at
http://www.fda.gov/opacornllaws/fdcactlfdcact5a.htm#sec50 5.
172 [d.
173 The definition of a new drug subject to FDA approval is as follows: "the term 'drug'
means (A) articles recognized in the official United States Pharmacopoeia, official Homoeopathic
Pharmacopoeia of the United States, or official National Formulary, or any supplement to any of
them; and (B) articles intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of
disease in man or other animals; and (C) articles (other than food) intended to affect the structure or
any function of the body of man or other animals; and (D) articles intended for use as a component
of any article specified in clause (A), (B), or (C). A food or dietary supplement for which a claim,
subject to sections 403(r)(I)(B) and 403(r)(3) or sections 403(r)(I)(B) and 403(r)(5)(D), is made in
accordance with the requirements of section 403(r) is not a drug solely because the label or the
labeling contains such a claim. A food, dietary ingredient, or dietary supplement for which a truthful
and not misleading statement is made in accordance with section 403(r)(6) is not a drug lUlder clause
(C) solely because the label or the labeling contains such a statement." Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 321; available at http://www.fda.gov/opacornllaws/fdcactlfdcact1.htm.
174 The "Orange Book," officially entitled "Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic
Equivalence Evaluations," is a "list of patents on drugs or drug products for which generic-drug
applications may be submitted to the Food and Drug Administration. The expiration dates of the
patents are also listed. An applicant may submit a generic-drug application at any time, but the
applicant must either accept deferral of FDA approval until the patent expires or contest the patent's
validity." WEBSTERS' NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2002).
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patents is already being performed, there will be little if any additional
cost associated with a standard based on this same differentiation.
Additionally, federal patent law itself distinguishes pharmaceutical
patents from other patents under the patent term extension provision of
the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act.175
Accordingly, the definitions provided therein could also be used to
distinguish pharmaceutical patents from other patents. Indeed, these
distinctions could be even more effective than using pharmaceutical
patents' inherent distinctiveness, because they distinguish other types of
patents that deal with molecular makeup from pharmaceutical patents. 176
Moreover, the distinctions made by these rules are directly
associated with the exorbitant costs that play an important role in why
pharmaceutical patents need a low standard for obviousness in the first
place. The regulation by the FDA is one of the major causes of the
increased pharmaceutical patent costs,l77 and the patent term extension
provision was carefully worded so as to apply only to those patents
affected by the increased costs due to matters such as FDA regulation. 178
Consequently, the already distinctive character of pharmaceutical
patents, combined with rules already in place designed to distinguish
them from other patents, result in the cost created in applying a dual
standard being minimal.
V.

CONCLUSION

In an era of what seems like continual innovation, the health of the
U.S. patent system is connected to the overall economic health of the
nation. Accordingly, because the standard for obviousness is the key to
the health of the patent system as a whole, its definition is critical to the
U.S. economy. As a result, it is no surprise that the Supreme Court's
reform of the obviousness standard in KSR has garnered the attention of
both the U.S. government and the leading companies in nearly every
industry.179 This attention not only is an indication of the importance of

175

37 C.F .R. § 1.710 (2008); see also 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2002).

176

Id.

177 Joseph A. DiMasi et aI., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development
Costs, J. HEALTH ECON., 22: 151-85, 165-66 (2003).
178 35 U.S.C. § I 56(a) (2002).
179 Brief of Altitude Capital Partners, Expanse Networks, Inc., Inflexion Point Strategy, LLC,
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the obviousness standard to the nation, but it is also a reflection of the
diverse needs that the standard must address.
When faced with a dynamic problem, the solution will often need to
be equally dynamic, and the solution to the problems with the
obviousness standard is no exception. Despite the best efforts of the
Supreme Court, a single standard solution for obviousness will never be
able to effectively address the needs of the patent system. Because of the
circumstances of our current patent system, if a single standard is
utilized, the more dynamic that standard is, the more difficult it will be to
apply. A dual standard solution is needed to address the diverse needs of
the patent system. Only a dual standard is capable of being sufficiently
dynamic to address the patent system's diverse set of needs, while not
sacrificing the ease with which it can be applied. Although the creation
of a dual standard creates with it new costs, these costs are minimal when
in Support of Respondents, KSR Int'I Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) (No. 04-1350),
2006 WL 2967758; Brief of Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation, Regents of the University of
California, Board of Regents of the University of Texas System, Washington Research Foundation,
Science and Technology Corporation @ UNM, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, and Research
Corporation Technologies, Inc. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, KSR Int'l Co. v.
Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) (No. 04-1350), 2006 WL 2967759; Brief for Technology
Properties Limited as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S.
Ct. 1727 (2007) (No. 04-1350), 2006 WL 2983160; Brief Amici Curiae of Michelin North America,
Inc., ArvinMeritor, Inc., and Nartron Corporation in Support of Respondent, KSR Int'l Co. v.
Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) (No. 04-1350), 2006 WL 2983162; Brief of Tessera, Inc.,
Qualcomm Inc., and AmberWave Systems Corporation as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents,
KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) (No. 04-1350), 2006 WL 2983163; Brief of
Biotechnology Industry Organization as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, KSR Int'l Co. v.
Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) (No. 04-1350), 2006 WL 2983166; Brieffor Amici Curiae 3M
Co., General Electric Co., Procter & Gamble Co., E.!. DuPont de Nemours and Co., and Johnson &
Johnson in Support of Respondents, KSR Int'I Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) (No. 041350), 2006 WL 3004029; Brief of Fallbrook Technologies, Inc.; Intellectual Ventures; Ellsworth
International, Inc.; GE02 Technologies, Inc.; Mobile Productivity, Inc.; Composite Technology
International, Inc.; Skyler Technology, Inc.; Private Management, Inc.; Technology, Patents &
Licensing, Inc.; and Intermune, Inc. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, KSR Int'l Co. v.
Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) (No. 04-1350),2006 WL 3004030; Brief for Amici Curiae
Time Warner Inc., lAC/Interactive Corp., and Viacom, Inc. in Support of Petitioner, KSR Int'l Co.
v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) (No. 04-1350), 2006 WL 2452363; Brieffor Amicus Curiae
Computer & Communications Industry Association in Support of Petitioner, KSR Int'l Co. v.
Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) (No. 04-1350), 2006 WL 2452364; Brief of Amici Curiae
Cisco Systems Inc., General Motors Corporation, Hallmark Cards, Incorporated, Fortune Brands Inc.
and Electrolux North America in Support of Reversal, KSR Int'I Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct.
1727 (2007) (No. 04-1350), 2006 WL 2452365; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioner, KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) (No. 04-1350), 2006
WL 2453601; Brief Amici Curiae of Ford Motor Company and DaimlerChrysler Corporation in
Support of Neither Party, KSR Int'I Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) (No. 04-1350), 2006
WL 2453603; Briefoflntel Corporation and Micron Technology, Inc. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioner, KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) (No. 04-1350), 2006 WL 2453606;
Brief of Amicus Curiae International Business Machines Corporation in Support of Neither Party,
KSR Int'I Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) (No. 04-1350), 2006 WL 2430566.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol39/iss1/3

38

Moody: A Dual Standard Solution

2008]

A DUAL STANDARD SOLUTION

109

compared to the cost of trying to apply a single standard to such a
dynamic problem. The Supreme Court has been struggling with the use
of a single standard for obviousness since its inception. It is time to
finally acknowledge that, in order to address the dynamic nature of the
problem, there is a need for an equally dynamic dual standard solution.
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